Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 21
Number 3 Spring 1994

Article 1

1-1-1994

Standards of Review and Constitutional Analysis of
Health Care Issues
Roy G. Spece Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Roy G. Spece Jr., Standards of Review and Constitutional Analysis of Health Care Issues, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 477 (1994).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol21/iss3/1

This Introduction is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

INTRODUCTION
Standards of Review and Constitutional
Analysis of Health Care Issues
By Roy G. SPECE,

JR.*

Health care challenges the Constitution like few other interests.
Health care is often as important as life itself, for without it one can be
condemned to a life not worth living. Although it is not a constitutional entitlement, many consider it a unique good that should be
available, at least in some form, regardless of socioeconomic
standing.'
Health care is dispensed by an immense industry, one that represents approximately 17% of our gross domestic product and employs
a substantial and growing portion of our work force. This industry has
undergone one radical change after another. It is heavily and inconsistently regulated and is subsidized by various governmental entities.
This state involvement is likely to increase-perhaps dramatically.
The health care industry is full of internal tensions, conflicting expectations, and market failures. It is continuingly changed through the
introduction of new techniques and technologies that may, at once, be
expensive, useful, and harmful. These technologies can challenge and
require rearticulation of some of our most basic concepts-life, death,
parenthood, responsibility, liberty, and property.2 In short, health
care and biomedical technologies affect more people in deeper and
elusive ways than perhaps any other processes. Little wonder, then,
that health care challenges our fundamental law-the Constitutionas few other interests do.
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law. J.D. 1972, University of
Southern California; B.A. 1972, California State University, Long Beach.
1. See generally 1 & 2 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDy OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE (1983).

2. MICHAEL H. SHAPIRO & Roy G. SPECE, JR., BIoETHICS AND LAW 18-20 (1981).
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All proper constitutional analyses, especially those touching on
health care, require certain explicit decisionmaking structures-usually described by the United States Supreme Court as "standards of
review." Some constitutional scholars have declared that talk of such
standards is naive, counter-productive, and misdescriptive of what the
Court actually does.3 The Court, however, continues ostensibly to
rely upon standards of review. It is little surprise, therefore, that all
the commentators in this symposium have arrayed their analyses and
arguments around standards of review. That would be remarkable if
standards of review were mere excrescences.
I
The Court fashions and abides by standards of review and ought
to do so explicitly and rigorously. This is particularly important in an
area such as health care, where basic interests and concepts clash and
evolve in unpredictable and sometimes unknowable ways, and where
the dynamics of a constantly changing industry involve the daily conduct of millions. In this context, unique cases will constantly arise.
Stare decisis alone will not provide the requisites of a rule of law; new
precedents must continuingly be fashioned. Analogies to prior cases
will sometimes be useful, but other times will be strained or non-existent. Rather than create new basic law out of whole cloth to deal with
unique cases individually, the Court must fashion and use standards of
review to subject health care and other interests and industries to the
rule of law.
Kathleen Sullivan's foreword to the Harvard Law Review's analysis of the Supreme Court's 1991 Term is devoted in substantial part
to a discussion of the rule of law and the concepts of "rules" and
"standards" as they apply to constitutional adjudication. 4 Although
"standard of review" as used here is different from the "standards"
discussed by Professor Sullivan (and by an entire body of literature on
"rules" vs. "standards"), part of her discussion is a good starting point:
Law translates background social policies or political principles
such as a truth, fairness, efficiency, autonomy, and democracy
into a grid of legal directives that decisionmakers in turn apply
to particular cases and facts. In a non-legal society, one might
3. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinkoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96
L.J. 943 (1987) (decrying the pervasiveness of balancing in constitutional law, but
not mentioning standards of review as a viable decisionmaking option); Robert F. Nagel,
The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MicH. L. REv. 165 (1985).
4. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court,1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22 (1992).
YALE
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apply these background policies or principles directly to a fact
situation. But, in a society with laws, using the intermediary of
legal directives is thought to make decisionmakers' lives easier,
improve the quality of their decisions, or constrain their naked
exercises of choice.
These mediating legal directives take different forms that
vary in the relative discretion they afford the decisionmaker.
These forms can be classified as either "rules" or "standards" to
signify where they fall on the continuum of discretion. Rules,
once formulated, afford decisionmakers less discretion than do
standards.'
Sullivan goes on to explain the strengths and weaknesses of "rules"
and "standards."6
Applying these concepts to constitutional law, Sullivan distinguishes between two approaches: categorization and balancing. Categorization (which is at the rules end of the continuum of discretion) is
epitomized by the Court's two-tiered substantive due process and
equal protection analysis. It is relatively predictable because it involves presumptions in favor of one-side or the other.7 Balancing
(which is at the standards end of the continuum) is represented by the
"shock the conscience" test enunciated in Rochin v. California.8 It is
relatively unpredictable because it allows the decisionmaker to determine anew which facts are relevant and how they should be given opProfessor Sullivan imaginatively applies
erative significance.9
distinctions among rules, standards, categorization, and balancing to
the Court's decisions in the 1991 term. She demonstrates that decisionmaking structures, whatever their-content, influence the Court's
deliberations.
I have summarized Professor Sullivan's provocative article in part
because it is a good background to several propositions I have formulated for this piece.
PropositionOne: Although a legal directive might constitute law,
it is not consistent with "the rule of law" unless it is specific enough,
along the continuum of rules and standards, to give reasonable notice
of proscribed and prescribed conduct.' ° "Reasonable" notice is that
5. Id. at 57.
6. Id. at 62-69.
7. Id. at 59-62.
8. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
9. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 61.
10. Concerning "the rule of law," see sources cited id. at 57 n.230. A legal directive
can be invalid in one sense (e.g., be unconstitutional) but still have legal force (e.g., when
one is prosecuted for violating an unconstitutional court order). See Vince Blasi, Prior
Restraints on Demonstrations,68 MicH. L. REv. 1481 (1970).
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considered adequate by informed observers who take due account of
the particular functions of the legal directive and the social and institutional context within which it operates.
PropositionTwo: "Standards of review" are those laws, rules, or
decisionmaking structures the Court "creates" to translate the Constitution from a set of vague precepts into a rule of law. Implicit in this
definition is the axiom that vague policies and political norms do not
bridle governmental or judicial discretion sufficiently to be consistent
with the rule of law; they allow rule by persons rather than by law. In
other words, although many scholars and judges consider them fictions or worse, standards of review are essential to the rule of law.
This is not to say that the Constitution does not conform with the rule
of law. Rather, the structure created by the Constitution and the ideal
of the rule of law inherent in the Constitution require the Court to
translate the basic document's often vague text, history, and structure
into rules.
Here these rules will be called "standards of review." The term
can be used in two senses. The first, used here, encompasses: (1) rules
about when the Court will exercise constitutional review at all; (2)
rules directing what rule to select out of two or more potential rules
regarding the degree of scrutiny the Court will exercise; and (3) the
specific elements of various rules regarding the degree of scrutiny the
Court will exercise. An example of (1) is the rule that one must establish a significant intrusion on a "life, liberty, or property" right to be
entitled to due process protection. An example of (2) is the rule that
the compelling state interest test will be used if one's fundamental
right to liberty is intruded upon. An example of (3) is the compelling
state interest test itself.
A second sense in which "standards of review" is used refers
solely to the specific elements of rules regarding the degree of scrutiny
the Court will exercise ((3) above). This is the sense in which courts
and commentators usually use the term. This narrower sense of "standards of review" is consistent with the term's use outside of the constitutional context. For example, "standard of review" in civil procedure
refers to the degree of scrutiny a reviewing court will apply (for example, the "clearly erroneous" standard for review of facts found by a
trial court).
Properly conceived, constitutional standards of review, in both
the broad sense used here and the narrower traditional sense, emanate from the text, structure, history, and values of the Constitution.
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They both result from and implement evaluative processes, and they
serve both heuristic and clarifying functions.
The rules the Court has fashioned can be better understood if one
recognizes that they focus on five questions: (a) What state interests
are relevant? (b) What state interests are weighty enough? (c) What
relationship must exist between the state's actions, means, or classifications and its interests? (d) Will actions, means, or classifications
that constitute less restrictive or more effective alternatives be required? and (e) What party must bear the "burdens of proof' (the
burdens of producing evidence and of persuasion) regarding the
above four questions?
Distinguishing among the various levels of analysis-(1) to (3)
and (a) to (e) above-facilitates decisionmaking.
Proposition Three: Rules regarding when constitutional scrutiny
will be ventured, what rules will be chosen, and the specific elements
of rules should be designed, constantly molded, and judged by their
ability to fulfill the following purposes: (1) to serve the values and
interests embedded in the history, structure, and text of the Constitution; (2) to give notice of constitutionally proscribed or prescribed
conduct to those addressed by the Constitution under various conditions; (3) to guide those subject to or benefitted by the Constitution in
initiating, pleading, settling, and presenting cases; (4) to guide lower
courts in deciding cases consonant with their duty to conform to rules
established by the Supreme Court; (5) to guide or bridle the discretion
of the Court by establishing certain rules of decisionmaking; (6) to
limit-strictly, in certain cases-the degree of the Court's intervention into the political process; (7) to improve the "political process"
(for example, by forcing the legislature to assert purposes for its actions, thus enhancing accountability); (8) to assist the Court in accurate and efficient decisionmaking; (9) to protect individual rights and
to establish a rough preferential ordering of values under which certain rights will be given special protection; (10) to protect the Court
from political limitation of its authority; (11) to make the Constitution
understandable to non-lawyers; (12) to avoid making a complete costbenefit analysis of actions subject to judicial review; and (13) to draw
on the insights provided by significant theories of jurisprudential and
constitutional interpretation."
11. Consider, for example, the insights that might be provided by the "legal process,"
"law and economics," "theories of the good," and "perspectives of outsiders" approaches
described in William W. Fisher III, The Development of Modem American Legal Theory
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I have discussed most of these purposes elsewhere.' 2 The majority are self-evident, but I will comment on the last three. First, as to
(11), non-lawyers and most lawyers might not be able to understand
judicial review based on a direct application of the philosophical principles articulated by John Rawls 13 or the economic precepts espoused
by Richard Epstein.14 They can grasp, however, the basic notions of
"ordinary versus fundamental rights," "compelling state interests,"
"less restrictive alternatives," and "utterly irrational actions" that
comprise most of the Court's substantive due process standards of review. Values associated with civic republicanism are fostered when
the Court's rules are widely accessible. 5
Second, as to (12), most persons would agree that the best way to
make a decision is to weigh all costs and benefits of every option, considering all rights and duties, of course. The Court could review all
governmental actions to see whether such a cost-benefit analysis was
correctly done. But the Court is obviously not equipped to perform
such a function in any significant number of cases. Even if it were, the
outcome of such broad ranging review would be so indeterminate that
none of the guidance functions of legal rules would be achieved. The
very term "standard of review" connotes a continuum of possible
levels of scrutiny, varying from the unlikely extreme of de novo review based on complete cost-benefit analysis to the other extreme of
reviewing only totally irrational actions.
Third and finally, as to (13), our culture and history are too rich
to bind our Constitution within one general theory. To do so would
demoralize adherents to powerful schools of thought and ignore the
insights and contributions of great minds. Standards of review can
provide predictability, but they should spring from an eclectic jurisprudence that represents our diverse culture and history. For example, although it would likely be unwise to base the Constitution on one
philosophical theory, certain philosophical principles might fill out
rules or criteria concerning what constitute fundamental rights or
compelling state interests.
and the Judicial Interpretationof the Bill of Rights, in A CULTURE OF RIGH's (Michael J.
Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991).
12. See Roy G. Spece, Jr., A PurposiveAnalysis of ConstitutionalStandardsof Judicial
Review and a PracticalAssessment of the Constitutionalityof RegulatingRecombinant DNA
Research, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1289-1293 (1978).
13. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusncE (1971).
14. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
15. David Schimmel, Book Review, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 166, 172-73 (1988).
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H
The debates and articles in this symposium each rely on standards
of review: in substantive due process and equal protection, procedural
due process, free exercise of religion, establishment of religion, takings, and "federalism." A brief review of the pieces shows how important, and sometimes problematic, standards of review are for the
health care field.
In her article,' 6 Professor Candice Hoke addresses Tenth Amendment and Spending Clause challenges to various health care reform
proposals, including the Clinton Plan. She briefly traces the history of
substantive principles of constitutional federalism. She explains that,
although the Court has preserved vigorous procedural and judicial immunities, it has allowed protective substantive principles such as the
intergovernmental immunity doctrine and the Tenth Amendment to
atrophy. She sets forth the Court's deferential spending clause standard of review, which has remained unchanged for decades.
The same cannot be said of Tenth Amendment doctrine, the ebb
and flow of which Professor Hoke traces from NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery'7 to Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 8 to New York v. United States.' 9 I will not assess the precise merits
of Professor Hoke's analysis; that task is performed by others elsewhere in this symposium. However, she does demonstrate a reasoned
approach to standards of review. She argues that New York sets forth
an understandable and workable standard, supporting her argument
by applying the standard to seven models of regulation she identifies
among the Clinton and other health care reform proposals. Moreover, she understands that standards of review are not simply arbitrary guidelines picked at random so as to provide future guidance.
Rather, they emanate from, and continuingly implement, the values
underlying the Constitution.
The values Professor Hoke identifies as underlying the New York
standard of review "are traceable to the more basic commitment of
actualizing republican process values, whether they argue greater diversity of cultures, or greater innovation in government, or reduced
threat of tyranny. This is the essential link between federalism and
16. Candice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National Health Reform: Tenth
Amendment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 489 (1994).
17. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
18. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
19. 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992).
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individual rights .... ,20 Professor Hoke convincingly demonstrates
that national health care reform will probably impinge on federalism
values. This is not surprising because health care consumes so much
of our gross domestic product and is so important to individuals. Her
analysis undermines a common view that has generally equated federalism concerns with hidden desires to subvert civil rights. Professor
Hoke forcefully argues that individual rights cannot thrive in a system
deprived of viable states.
Professor Thomas Merrill in his article 2 ' argues that physicians
must be guaranteed a fair rate of return on their investment in human
capital. Professor William Brewbaker's article 22 concludes, on the
other hand, that price controls will be held constitutional unless they
are so severe that they force physicians (or hospitals) to stop doing
business.
Professor Merrill rests his analysis on the takings cases holding
that public utilities must receive a fair rate of return on capital investments. This illustrates the importance of standards of review in the
health care area. The health care industry has and is evolving in so
many ways that there is no good case analogy within the takings area.
Stare decisis is not sufficient. Arguing that each physician is a little
public utility seems inappropriate. If there were sufficient standards
of review in the takings area, new precedents could be properly generated from those standards. As Professor Brewbaker points out in his
article, however, takings clause standards of review are in a state of
disarray. Although the Court has developed certain per se tests that
provide some guidance, one cannot predict when the Court will use
which per se test or when it will resort to ad hoe balancing.
Brewbaker also argues that physician price controls raise a question
over unfair redistributions of wealth that ought to be decided under
substantive due process and the rational basis test. This, in turn, suggests that the Court and commentators should develop coherence
among substantive due process and regulatory takings standards of
review.
The reader should note whether Professor Merrill gives sufficient
attention to the particular right or degree of intrusion thereon that is
necessary to support a regulatory takings claim. (Similar questions
20. Hoke, supra note 16, at 547.
21. Thomas W. Merrill, Constitutional Limits on Physician Price Controls, 21 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 635 (1994).
22. William S. Brewbaker III, Health Care Price Controls and the Takings Clause,21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 669 (1994).
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arise concerning Merrill's related discussion concerning procedural
due process.) It is reasonable to argue that the capacity for labor is
"property," and courts have so held.' However, is it likely that courts
will accept the notion that physicians' labor is unique because it represents an investment in human capital?
Professor Brewbaker raises the interesting point that it is not at
all clear whether physicians can complain of any net disadvantage
from government regulation of health care. He argues that only such
a net disadvantage can support a constitutional claim. This raises
questions that need further attention: Should the Court's takings and/
or procedural due process rules only look to the net effect of governmental action to determine if there is a sufficient intrusion? If so,
over what range of activities and what range of time?
Professor Ann Massie's article2 4 analyzes the constitutionality of
state laws that exempt parents from child abuse laws when they withhold medical care from their children on religious grounds. Massie
concludes that: (1) parents' free exercise of religion and autonomy
rights do not require the exemptions; (2) the exemptions violate the
Establishment Clause; and (3) the exemptions violate childrens' rights
to free exercise of religion and equal protection. I will only address

(2).
In her discussion of accommodation of religion under the Establishment Clause, Professor Massie proposes a three-part test, modifying a test offered by Justice Brennan in one of his plurality opinions. 25
Professor Massie suggests that it can fill out the endorsement test and
replace the Lemon test 26 in the context of religious exemptions from
generally applicable laws. The test is:
(1) the accommodation should lift a state-imposed burden from
the religious actor; (2) the burden should pose a significant deterrent to the free exercise of religion (although the relief need
not be mandated by the Free Exercise Clause for the accommodation to be valid); and (3) nonbeneficiaries should not be

23. See, e.g., Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989) (requiring attorney to
devote more than 10% of his normal work year to court-appointed cases for extremely low
compensation constituted a taking).
24. An MacLean Massie, The Religion Clauses and ParentalHealth Care Decisionmaking for Children: Suggestions for a New Approach, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725
(1994).
25. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (plurality opinion).
26. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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markedly burdened by the .accommodation to the religious
actor. 27
Professor Massie then applies this modified test to exemptions from
child abuse prosecution. She argues that exemptions meet the first
two requirements of the test, but fail the third one because, from the
perspective of secular society, exemptions markedly disadvantage a
vulnerable class of third parties-children.
The test analyzed and applied by Massie seems to fulfill the guidance functions required by the rule of law and to accommodate properly the values at stake. The first requirement helps to prevent
legislative overreaching to protect religiously motivated individuals or
groups. The second requirement limits governmental overreaching in
favor of religion by limiting intervention to cases in which free exercise values are significantly at risk. The third requirement encourages
any exceptions to be closely tailored to alleviating free exercise burdens. These advantages square with the values inherent in the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. The requirements are relatively
clear and can be manageably applied. Professor Massie's proposed
test illustrates how standards of review both grow out of and implement the evaluative functions required by the Constitution.
In his article,2 8 Professor Robert Sedler develops a position advanced in Michigan litigation by the ACLU that it is unconstitutional
to deny competent, terminally ill individuals the use of physician-prescribed medications to hasten their deaths. He extends the same argument to persons who are so physically debilitated that they are in
unendurable pain. He argues, however, that it is permissible for the
government to prohibit assisted suicide on demand. In his article,2 9
Thomas Marzen, General Counsel of the National Legal Center for
the Medically Dependent and Disabled, counters, arguing that the
state can constitutionally ban all assisted suicide.
Professor Sedler argues that the limited right to assisted suicide is
analogous to the right to privacy or autonomy recognized in Roe v.
Wadea" and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.3 ' Marzen counters that
there is no liberty at issue in assisted suicide. Roe and Casey demon27. Massie, supra note 24, at 766. Professor Massie argues that, although Justice Brennan apparently intended the first and third criteria to be disjunctive, they should be independent requirements. Id. at 766 n.221.
28. Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Challenges to Bans on "Assisted Suicide": The
View From Without and Within, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777 (1994).
29. Thomas J. Marzen, "Out, Out Brief Candle". Constitutionally PrescribedSuicide
for the Terminally Ill, 21 HAsTmos CONST. L.Q. 799 (1994).
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).

Spring 19941

INTRODUCTION: STANDARDS OF REVIEW

strate, again, the inadequacy of stare decisis as the foundation for constitutional decisionmaking about health care. Casey purports to be
consistent with Roe,32 but nobody can discern precisely how this is the
case, particularly concerning what constitutes a fundamental right and
what standard of review should apply if there is a substantial intrusion
on a fundamental right. Both involve a blend of bodily integrity and
decisionmaking about reproduction, confounded by the termination
of a living entity. Once again, generating sound decisions and guidance over a range of cases and a span of time requires better standards of review, including rules concerning the existence of "liberties"
and the nature of ordinary versus fundamental rights. The Court has
established various formulas for recognition of liberties, for example,
"deeply rooted in our history and traditions '33 and "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. ' 34 As I have explained elsewhere, one can
also discern several criteria that the Court and other authorities have
considered relevant to determining whether a liberty is fundamental:
importance to the constitutional scheme of social or political organization; importance to our concepts of personal liberty; historical establishment and recognition; non-economic basis; nexus to other
fundamental rights; importance to individuals (for example, not having the right to obtain an abortion can shackle a woman with serious,
lifetime burdens); claim against intervention rather than demand for
subsidy; relative specificity within the text of the Constitution; and
claim against paternalistic intervention. 35 One can search precedents
that have recognized fundamental rights for these criteria. Then one
can compare the number and degree of these factors involved in one's
case to the presence and strength of the factors in the precedents. The
reader should ask whether either Professor Sedler or Attorney
Marzen correctly applies the precedents or the criteria that have been
established concerning discernment of liberties and fundamental
liberties.
Student note writer Jeanne Vance36 analyzes the constitutionality.
of proposed laws that would pay women on welfare for beginning and
continuing to use Norplant, a long-acting implantable contraceptive
32. Id. at 2804.
33. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
34. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
35. See Roy G. Spece, Jr., Justifying Invigorated Scrutiny and the Least Restrictive Alternative as a Superior Form of Intermediate Review: Civil Commitment and the Right to
Treatment as a Case Study, 21 ARIz. L. Rnv. 1049, 1062-73 (1979).
36. Jeanne L. Vance, Note, Womb for Rent: Norplantand the Undoing of Poor Women,

21 HASINGS

CONST.

L.Q. 827 (1994).

488

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 21:477

agent. Vance applies the Court's established doctrine to the Norplant
problem. She argues that such laws would violate substantive due
process and equal protection. Under substantive due process, she argues that the Court should apply the compelling state interest test
adopted in Roe, but that it might apply the undue burden test fashioned by the plurality in Casey. She duly notes the ambiguity and
inadequacy of the undue burden test. Under equal protection, she
argues that the Court should apply the intermediate scrutiny test
adopted in CraigV. Boren,37 but that it might apply the rational basis
test used in the "real gender difference" cases.
Each of the articles in this symposium draws upon both precedents and standards of review. Their analyses demonstrate that standards of review are particularly necessary in a dynamic area such as
health care, where yesterday's cases may offer little guidance by way
of analogy. Some of the articles suggest refinements to improve existing standards. Courts and commentators should continue to attend
to the development of standards of review that will assist us in bridling
health care and biomedical technology within the purposes of the
Constitution.

37. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

